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NSC - R. MOLANDER

JCS - COL. GRANGER

OSD - COL. KLASS

ACDA - J. NEWHOUSE

EUR - J. GOODBY

PM - D. GOMPERT

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TO USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE

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AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE

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INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS PRIORITY

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S E C R E T STATE 177957

EXDIS GENEVA FOR USSALT TWO

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: ;ATO, PARM

SUBJECT: JULY 19 NAC ON SALT AND THEATER SYSTEMS

SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 177957

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1. SUMMARY: THIS MESSAGE PROVIDES GUIDANCE FOR USNATO FOR PRESENTATION AT THE JULY 19 NAC ON THE US STATEMENT ON THEATER SYSTEMS, AND INSTRUCTIONS FOR BONN, LONDON, AND PARIS ON BRIEFING HOST GOVERNMENTS PRIOR TO THAT SESSION. END SUMMARY.

2. FOLLOWING CONCLUSION OF BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS IN WASHINGTON (REFTELS), WE HAVE CONCLUDED THAT US SHOULD

PLAN TO MAKE PROPOSED STATEMENT ON THEATER SYSTEMS AT AN APPROPRIATE TIME ONCE SALT II HAS BEEN SIGNED, WHETHER OR NOT THE SOVIETS MAKE EXPLICIT STATEMENT DEALING WITH THEATER ISSUES. STATEMENT IS INTENDED TO RESPOND TO PERCEPTIONS OF NEGOTIATING SITUATION ARISING FROM INCLUSION OF CRUISE MISSILES IN SALT II PROTOCOL AND AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLES FOR SALT III TO CONTINUE NEGOTIATIONS ON PROTOCOL ISSUES. STATEMENT IS NOT RPT NOT AN INDICATION THAT US HAS DETERMINED THAT NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD OR WILL AFFECT THEATER SYSTEMS, AND SHOULD NOT RPT NOT BE SEEN AS AN INVITATION TO SUCH NEGOTIATIONS.

IT IS A MARKER, TO SERVE NOTICE ON THE USSR THAT IF IT PURSUES LIMITS ON OUR SYSTEMS PRINCIPALLY DESIGNED FOR THEATER MISSIONS, WE RESERVE THE RIGHT TO SEEK LIMITS ON ITS THEATER SYSTEMS. IT REFLECTS THE EXPECTATION THAT THE SOVIETS WILL CONTINUE THEIR EFFORTS TO LIMIT

-- CRUISE MISSILES IN SALT III. THE LANGUAGE WAS CAREFULLY DESIGNED TO LEAVE OPEN ALL OPTIONS WITH RESPECT TO HOW, IF AT ALL, NEGOTIATIONS ON THEATER SYSTEMS SHOULD BE PURSUED. AS WE INDICATED IN BILATERALS, US HAS MADE NO DECISIONS ON THIS SUBJECT, AND LOOKS FORWARD

SECRET

PAGE 03 STATE 177957

TO EXPLORING ALL ASPECTS OF THE ISSUE INFORMALLY THIS FALL, INITIALLY IN BILATERALS WITH THE FRG, UK AND GOF, AND THEN IN SOME YET-TO-BE-DETERMINED FORM IN THE ALLIANCE. WHILE, AS WE INDICATED IN BILATERALS, THE JULY 19 NAC WOULD CONCLUDE CONSIDERATION OF THE US STATEMENT ON THEATER SYSTEMS, AND THUS WRAP UP THIS ISSUE WITHIN THE ALLIANCE FOR SALT II, THIS ONLY REPRESENTS THE BEGINNING OF DISCUSSION OF THE SUBSTANTIVE ISSUE ITSELF. WE DO NOT WANT TO GET INTO DISCUSSION OF SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES AT THE JULY 19 NAC, -- OR QUESTIONS OF NATO CONSULTATIVE MECHANISMS -- BUT HOPE TO RECEIVE AT LEAST TACIT ALLIED ACQUIESCE IN OUR PROPOSED STATEMENT AS A MEANS OF HANDLING THE PROBLEM IN SALT II. WE ARE CONVINCED THAT OUR APPROACH WILL PROTECT ALL US AND ALLIED INTERESTS, LEAVING US TIME TO WORK OUT TOGETHER AN AGREED ALLIANCE APPROACH TO THE SUBSTANCE BEGINNING THIS FALL.

3. FOR USNATO: AT JULY 19 NAC, AMBASSADOR SHOULD OFFER DETAILED EXPLANATION OF US STATEMENT ON THEATER SYSTEMS, DRAWING ON THE FOLLOWING TALKING POINTS:

-- AT THE NAC ON FEBRUARY 24, THE US PRESENTED THE FOLLOWING ILLUSTRATIVE FORMULATION ON THEATER SYSTEMS, WHICH THE US WOULD MAKE AS A UNILATERAL STATEMENT OF FURTHER OBJECTIVES FOR SALT THREE:

"ANY FUTURE LIMITATIONS ON US SYSTEMS PRINCIPALLY DESIGNED FOR THEATER MISSIONS SHOULD BE ACCOMPANIED BY APPROPRIATE LIMITATIONS ON SOVIET THEATER SYSTEMS";

-- THIS STATEMENT WILL BE ISSUED SEPARATELY FROM THE TEXT OF THE SALT TWO AGREEMENT AND THE ASSOCIATED JOINT STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES AND BASIC GUIDELINES FOR SUBSEQUENT NEGOTIATIONS. IT WILL BE ISSUED BY THE US ALONE, AND WILL NOT PURPORT TO CARRY ANY SOVIET ENDORSEMENT.

SECRET

PAGE 04 STATE 177957

THE US PLANS TO MAKE THE STATEMENT TO THE NAC AND TO THE

US CONGRESS AT AN APPROPRIATE TIME ONCE A SALT II AGREEMENT IS SIGNED.

-- THE PURPOSE OF THE FORMULATION IS TO SERVE NOTICE ON THE SOVIETS THAT IN RELATION TO ANY POSSIBLE DISCUSSION IN FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS OF LIMITATIONS ON US SYSTEMS PRINCIPALLY DESIGNED FOR THE THEATER, THE US RESERVES THE RIGHT TO RAISE SOVIET THEATER SYSTEMS, WHILE AT THE SAME TIME PRESERVING THE FLEXIBILITY TO PURSUE LIMITATIONS ON SUCH SYSTEMS OR NOT, DEPENDING ON WHAT THE US AND THE ALLIES DETERMINE IS IN NATO'S BEST SECURITY INTERESTS.

-- THE STATEMENT IS A MARKER, NOT AN INVITATION TO NEGOTIATIONS ON US AND SOVIET THEATER SYSTEMS. IT RESPONDS TO CONCERS THAT HAVE BEEN EXPRESSED REGARDING THE SALT POSITION ON THEATER SYSTEMS, GIVEN THAT CRUISE MISSILES ARE INCLUDED IN THE SALT II PROTOCOL AND GIVEN THE PROVISION IN THE PRINCIPLES FOR SALT III THAT PROTOCOL ISSUES WILL BE ON THE AGENDA FOR SALT III.

THE FORMULATION IS SPECIFICALLY DESIGNED NOT ONLY TO LEAVE OPEN THE QUESTION OF WHETHER OR NOT TO PURSUE LIMITATIONS ON THEATER SYSTEMS, BUT ALSO TO KEEP OPEN ALL OPTIONS WITH RESPECT TO PARTICULAR NEGOTIATING ARRANGEMENTS OR OBJECTIVES. THIS APPROACH WILL GIVE THE ALLIANCE TIME TO CONSIDER IN DEPTH ITS THEATER NUCLEAR FORCE REQUIREMENTS AND THE ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF INVOLVING THEATER SYSTEMS IN ARMS CONTROL. WILL REVIEW PARTICULAR ASPECTS OF THE ILLUSTRATIVE FORMULATION.

SECRET

PAGE 05 STATE 177957

TIMING:

-- THE REFERENCE TO "FUTURE" LIMITATIONS, IN THE CONTEXT OF THE TIMING OF THIS STATEMENT AT THE CONCLUSION OF

THE SALT TWO NEGOTIATIONS, APPLIES TO LIMITATIONS AGREED
TO SUBSEQUENT TO THAT DATE.

TYPES OF SYSTEMS:

-- THE LANGUAGE REFLECTS THE EXPECTATION THAT THE SOVIETS WILL, IN FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS, SEEK LIMITATIONS ON SOME US SYSTEMS PRINCIPALLY DESIGNED FOR THEATER MISSIONS, AND SETS FORTH THE GENERAL PROPOSITION THAT IF SUCH SYSTEMS WERE LIMITED, THEN SOVIET THEATER SYSTEMS OF CONCERN TO THE WEST SHOULD IN THAT CASE ALSO BE APPROPRIATELY LIMITED;

-- "US SYSTEMS PRINCIPALLY DESIGNED FOR THEATER MISSIONS" REFERS TO THOSE US NUCLEAR DELIVERY SYSTEMS OF THE TYPES, RANGES AND CAPABILITIES BASED PRIMARILY IN THE THEATER, AND COULD ENCOMPASS, AMONG OTHER THINGS, SOME OF THOSE FORCES CALLED FORWARD BASED SYSTEMS. THE LANGUAGE EXCLUDES US ICBMS, SLBMS, AND HEAVY BOMBERS, INCLUDING THOSE US SYSTEMS OF THIS CLASS WHICH MAY BE ASSIGNED THEATER MISSIONS (E.G., THE POSEIDON COMMITMENT TO SACEUR). WITH REGARD TO CRUISE MISSILES, THOSE VARIANTS WHICH HAVE POTENTIAL APPLICATIONS PRIMARILY FOR THEATER MISSIONS WOULD BE CONSIDERED THEATER SYSTEMS IN THE CONTEXT OF THE STATEMENT;

-- THE FORMULATION IS NOT MEANT TO ALTER THE HANDLING OF NUCLEAR ELEMENTS IN MBFR WHERE OPTION III NUCLEAR OFFER HAS BEEN LINKED TO REDUCTIONS IN SOVIET TANKS;
-- THE FORMULATION IS NOT INTENDED TO IMPLY ANY POSITION REGARDING THE KIND OF SOVIET RESTRAINT WE WOULD CONSIDER
SECRET

PAGE 06 STATE 177957

A SUFFICIENT RESPONSE TO US RESTRAINT ON THE ER WEAPON.

FORUM:

-- THE STATEMENT REFERS ONLY TO US AND SOVIET SYSTEMS, AND WILL BE ISSUED AT AN APPROPRIATE TIME ONCE A SALT TWO AGREEMENT IS SIGNED AS PART OF A UNILATERAL STATEMENT DEALING WITH CERTAIN SALT OR SALT THREE-RELATED OBJECTIVES. IT thus REFLECTS THE EXPECTATION THAT THE SOVIETS WILL RAISE FBS AND CRUISE MISSILES WITH POTENTIAL THEATER APPLICATIONS IN FUTURE SALT TALKS. BUT THE LANGUAGE IS DESIGNED TO KEEP ALL OPTIONS OPEN REGARDING THE FORUM FOR POSSIBLE NEGOTIATIONS ON THEATER SYSTEMS.

TYPES OF LIMITATIONS:

-- THE FORMULATION LEAVES OPEN THE TYPE OR DEGREE OF LIMITATIONS WHICH MIGHT BE APPLIED TO US OR SOVIET THEATER SYSTEMS.

WE CANNOT KNOW AT THIS POINT HOW HARD THE SOVIETS MAY PUSH THE THEATER WEAPONS ISSUE, OR WHAT LIMITATIONS ON US SYSTEMS THEY WOULD SEEK IN EXCHANGE FOR LIMITS ON THEIR THEATER SYSTEMS. SIMILARLY, THE DEGREE OF LIMITATION, IF ANY, ACCEPTABLE ON OUR SIDE WILL BE DETERMINED BY CALCULATION OF OUR MILITARY REQUIREMENTS AND THE POSSIBILITIES FOR OBTAINING SIGNIFICANT LIMITS ON SOVIET THEATER SYSTEMS. IN THIS REGARD, I WOULD NOTE THE IMPORTANCE OF THE WORK OF THE NPG HIGH LEVEL GROUP, IN DEVELOPING ALLIANCE POLICY ON FUTURE FORCE REQUIREMENTS.

THE PHRASE "ACCOMPANIED BY APPROPRIATE LIMITATIONS" MEANS THAT FUTURE LIMITATIONS THE US MIGHT BE PREPARED

SECRET

PAGE 07 STATE 177957

TO ACCEPT ON US SYSTEMS PRINCIPALLY DESIGNED FOR THEATER MISSIONS E.G., RANGE, GEOGRAPHIC, NUMERICAL SHOULD BE ACCOMPANIED BY COMMENSURATE, BUT NOT NECESSARILY IDENTICAL, LIMITATIONS ON SOVIET THEATER SYSTEMS. THE CHARACTER OF THE LIMITATIONS ON SOVIET SYSTEMS WHICH WOULD BE APPROPRIATE" WOULD DEPEND, IN PART, ON AN EVALUATION OF THE IMPACT ON US CAPABILITIES OF THE LIMITATIONS ON US SYSTEMS WHICH WE MIGHT BE PREPARED TO ACCEPT.

IT SHOULD ALSO BE RECOGNIZED THAT OUR ABILITY TO NEGOTIATE SIGNIFICANT LIMITATIONS ON SOVIET SYSTEMS OF CONCERN TO US WOULD DEPEND NOT ONLY ON WHAT US SYSTEMS WE MIGHT BE PREPARED TO SEE LIMITED, BUT ALSO ON THE STRINGENCY OF THE LIMITS, E.G., ON NUMBERS OR RANGE, WE WERE WILLING TO ACCEPT.

THE FORMULATION DOES NOT QUALIFY WHAT CLASSES OF US SYSTEMS DESIGNED PRINCIPALLY FOR THEATER MISSIONS COULD BE INCLUDED IN FUTURE LIMITATIONS; NOR DOES IT SPECIFY SOVIET THEATER SYSTEMS ON WHICH LIMITATIONS WOULD BE CONSIDERED APPROPRIATE.

WE HAVE NOT ATTEMPTED, AND WOULD NOT WISH TO ATTEMPT, A RIGOROUS GEOGRAPHIC DEFINITION OF "THEATER". THE "THEATER NUCLEAR" LEG OF THE NATO TRIAD IS A WELL UNDERSTOOD CONCEPT, WHICH COVERS A VARIETY OF SYSTEMS AND MISSIONS, WITH DIFFERENT CAPABILITIES AND BASING, ALL DEDICATED TO PROVIDING THE ELEMENT OF DETERRENCE BETWEEN NATO CONVENTIONAL AND EXTERNAL STRATEGIC FORCES.

-- AS PRECEDING POINTS INDICATE, THE FORMULATION WILL PROTECT ALL OF THE ALLIANCE OPTIONS REGARDING THEATER SYSTEMS, INCLUDING THE BASIC QUESTION OF WHETHER OR NOT WE WISH TO SEE ARMS CONTROL AFFECTING US AND SOVIET THEATER SYSTEMS.

SECRET

PAGE 08 STATE 177957

4. FOR USNATO: IF THE QUESTION IS ASKED WHY THE US IS PREPARED TO VOLUNTEER THIS STATEMENT, RATHER THAN CONDITIONING ITS USE ON A PRIOR EXPLICIT SOVIET STATEMENT REGARDING THEATER SYSTEMS, AMBASSADOR SHOULD NOTE THAT, AS INDICATED IN ABOVE TALKING POINTS, THE STATEMENT IS DESIGNED TO RESPOND TO A;D ALLEVIATE PERCEPTIONS OF THE NEGOTIATING SITUATION, INDEPENDENT OF WHETHER OR NOT SOVIETS MAKE A STATEMENT ON THEATER SYSTEMS, IN THE AGREED

INCLUSION OF CRUISE MISSILES IN THE SALT II PROTOCOL AND THE PROVISION IN THE PRINCIPLES FOR SALT III THAT PROTOCOL ISSUES WILL BE ON THE AGENDA FOR SALT III.

5. FOR LONDON AND PARIS: EMBASSIES SHOULD APPROACH FCO (MOBERLY, WILBERFORCE), AND QUAI (PAGNIEZ) AND INDICATE THAT, FOLLOWING UP ON BILATERALS IN WASHINGTON, WE PLAN TO PROCEED WITH THE NAC ON JULY 19 TO EXPLAIN US STATEMENT ON THEATER SYSTEMS TO FULL ALLIANCE. EMBASSIES SHOULD MAKE FOLLOWING POINTS:

-- WE FULLY APPRECIATE HMG'S (GOF) UNCERTAINTIES REGARDING THE PROSPECT OF ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS AFFECTING US AND SOVIET THEATER SYSTEMS; WE ARE BOTH AWARE OF THE VARIETY OF VIEWS IN THE ALLIANCE ON THIS; WE HAVE OURSELVES MADE NO DECISIONS O THIS, AND SEE OUR STATEMENT AS A MARKER TO HOLD THE SITUATION OPEN UNTIL SUCH TIME AS WE AND THE ALLIES CAN ARRIVE AT AGREED POSITIONS.

-- WHILE WE SEE JULY 19 AS CONCLUDING THE CONSIDERATION OF THIS STATEMENT, AND HENCE WRAPPING UP THE ISSUE FOR SALT II, WE ARE AS CONCERNED AS HMG (GOF) TO GET TOGETHER TO DISCUSS THE SUBSTANCE OF THIS PROBLEM, WHICH THE

SECRET

PAGE 09 STATE 177957

STATEMENT DOES NOT PRETEND TO DO. AS WE INDICATED IN THE BILATERALS, WE WOULD ENVISAGE INFORMAL TALKS THIS FALL, ON A BILATERAL BASIS, LEADING TO DISCUSSIONS IN THE ALLIANCE AS OUR MUTUAL THINKING DEVELOPS. WE WILL BE DEVELOPING IDEAS FOR THOSE TALKS, AND WOULD HOPE HMG (GOF) WOULD DO THE SAME.

-- WE UNDERSTAND THAT HMG (GOF) WOULD PREFER THAT WE NOT SAY ANYTHING ABOUT THEATER SYSTEMS UNLESS THE SOVIETS MAKE A PRIOR EXPLICIT STATEMENT. HOWEVER, HMG (GOF) MUST UNDERSTAND THE DESIREABILITY OF RESPONDING TO CONCERN WHICH HAVE BEEN EXPRESSED REGARDING THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE INCLUSION OF CERTAIN CRUISE MISSILE LIMITATIONS IN THE PROTOCOL AND THE PROVISION IN THE PRINCIPLES FOR

SALT III THAT PROTOCOL ISSUES WILL BE ON THE AGENDA FOR SALT III. IT IS IMPORTANT WE SERVE NOTICE ON THE USSR THAT IF IT PURSUES LIMITS ON OUR SYSTEMS PRINCIPALLY DESIGNE, FOR THEATERMISSIONS, WE RESERVE THE RIGHT TO SEEK LIMITS ON ITS THEATER SYSTEMS

-- OUR STATEMENT IS IN NO SENSE AN INVITATION TO NEGOTIATION ON THEATER SYSTEMS. THAT QUESTION IS OPEN. ALL WE ARE DOING IS SERVING NOTICE ON THE SOVIETS THAT THEY CANNOT PURSUE LIMITS ON US SYSTEMS WITHOUT EXPECTING THAT WE MAY RAISE LIMITATIONS ON THEIR SYSTEMS.

6. FOR BONN: EMBASSY SHOULD CALL ON FOREIGN MINISTRY (RUTH) TO INDICATE THAT WE WILL BE DISCUSSING STATEMENT ON THEATER SYSTEMS AT JULY 19 NAC AND THAT, HAVING CONSIDERED BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS I WASHINGTON, WE HAVE DETERMINED THAT WE WILL BE PREPARED TO MAKE THE STATEMENT AT AN APPROPRIATE TIME ONCE SALT II HAS BEEN SIGNED, WHETHER OR NOT SOVIETS MAKE A PRIOR EXPLICIT STATEMENT REGARDING THEATER SYSTEMS. THIS US DECISION ADDRESSES THE PRIMARY FRG CONCERN AS EXPRESSED IN THE BILATERALS. IT PROTECTS OUR FUTURE NEGOTIATING POSITION, AND HOLDS

SECRET

PAGE 10 STATE 177957

OPEN OUR OPTIONS WHILE WE CONSIDER, BILATERALLY AND IN THE ALLIANCE, WHAT FUTURE COURSE WE WANT TO FOLLOW. EMBASSY SHOULD MAKE CLEAR THAT STATEMENT DOES NOT RPT NOT CONSTITUTE COMMITMENT TO NEGOTIATE ON THEATER SYSTEMS, BUT HOLDS THAT QUESTION OPEN. FRG SHOULD BE AWARE OF STRONG UK AND FRENCH VIEWS ON THIS POINT. BEYOND THE JULY 19 NAC, WHICH SHOULD CONCLUDE DISCUSSION OF THE STATEMENT ITSELF WITHI THE ALLIANCE, AND THUS WRAP UP THIS ISSUE FOR SALT II, WE ARE VERY MUCH LOOKING FORWARD TO MORE SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSIONS THIS FALL ON AN INFORMAL BILATERAL "SEMINAR" BASIS. WE WILL BE WORKING TO PREPARE FOR THOSE DISCUSSIONS, AND WOULD HOPE THE FRG COULD BRING SOME IDEAS AS WELL.

WE ARE AWARE THAT THE FRG MAY STILL HAVE PROBLEMS WITH THE TERM "SYSTEMS PRINCIPALLY DESIGNED FOR THEATER MISSIONS", PREFERRING INSTEAD TO REFER TO THE SYSTEMS IN QUESTION AS "MEDIUM-RANGE" IN ORDER TO BLUR THE LINE BETWEEN THEATER AND STRATEGIC WEAPONS. WE HAVE CONSIDERED THIS POINT, AND AS WE INDICATED IN THE BILATERALS, WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT THERE WOULD BE SERIOUS DIFFICULTIES IN TRYING TO USE RANGE CRITERIA IN THE FORMULATION; THE WORDS MEDIUM-RANGE COULD APPEAR TO APPLY TO WHOLE CLASSES OF SYSTEMS ON A GLOBAL BASIS. MOREOVER, GIVEN GEOGRAPHIC SITUATION IN EUROPE, ADOPTION OF RANGE AS THE KEY CRITERION COULD GIVE THE SOVIETS EXPLOITABLE ADVANTAGES. THE USE OF THE WORD "THEATER" IN THE FORMULATION IS FLEXIBLE, GENERAL, AND UNDERSTANDABLE IN TERMS OF RECENT

CONCERNS.

7. FOR OTHER NATO CAPITALS AND USNATO- IF YOU RECEIVE
QUESTIONS FROM HOST GOVERNMENTS OR OTHER DELEGATIONS CON-
CERNING THE SUBSTANCE OF THE JULY 19 NAC YOU SHOULD INDI-
SECRET

PAGE 11 STATE 177957

CATE THAT WE INTEND TO PROVIDE AN EXPLANATION OF THE US
STATEMENT ON THEATER SYSTEMS, WHICH WAS GIVEN TO THE NAC
ON FEBRUARY 24. CHRISTOPHER

SECRET

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